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dispersal of SARS-CoV-2? investigation 
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Abstract 
Background: Super-spreaders are individuals infecting disproportionately large numbers of contacts. They probably 
play a crucial role in the transmission of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2). We describe 
a super-spreading event within a team working in an open-space office and investigate factors potentially having 
facilitated SARS-CoV-2 transmission.
Methods: In this retrospective cohort study, semi-structured telephone interviews with all team members were 
carried out to identify symptoms, contacts, and adherence to basic hygiene measures. During site visits, we gathered 
information about workplace and seating arrangements. The secondary attack rate in office and households was cal-
culated. Potential respiratory viral co-infections were assessed by multiplex PCR. SARS-CoV-2 whole-genome sequenc-
ing was performed using a tiled-amplicon sequencing approach.
Results: Of 13 team members, 11 fell ill with Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). Due to the sequence of events 
and full genome sequence data, one person was considered the index case for this outbreak, directly infecting 67 to 
83% of the teammates. All team members reported repetitive close contacts among themselves during joint com-
puter work, team meetings and a “Happy Birthday” serenade. Two individuals shared nuts and dates. The arrangement 
of the office and meeting rooms precluded sufficient adherence to physical distancing. The index case and a further 
individual were diagnosed with an adenovirus serotype 4 co-infection.
Conclusion: We identified several environmental and behavioral factors that probably have facilitated the transmis-
sion of SARS-CoV-2. The relevance of the adenovirus co-infection remains unclear and merits further investigation.
Keywords: COVID-19, SARS-CoV-2, Super-spreading, Co-infection, Adenovirus, Transmission, Secondary attack rate, 
Outbreak investigation
© The Author(s) 2020. Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which 
permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the 
original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or 
other third party material in this article are included in the article’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line 
to the material. If material is not included in the article’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory 
regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this 
licence, visit http://creat iveco mmons .org/licen ses/by/4.0/. The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication waiver (http://creat iveco 
mmons .org/publi cdoma in/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article, unless otherwise stated in a credit line to the data.
Background
The Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) emerged 
in late December 2019 in Wuhan, China. The causative 
agent is the severe acute respiratory syndrome coro-
navirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), a betacoronavirus, related to 
SARS-CoV and Middle Eastern respiratory syndrome 
coronavirus (MERS-CoV). COVID-19 was declared a 
pandemic in March 2020 [1]. As of November 13, more 
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than 53,000,000 of COVID-19 cases have been reported 
worldwide [2]. The primary mode of transmission is 
assumed to happen by droplet or contact [3, 4]. It has 
not yet been resolved whether SARS-CoV-2 might also 
spread through aerosols [5]. Since highest viral loads in 
throat swabs are present at the time of symptom onset, 
peak infectiousness was inferred to be on or before 
symptom onset [6]. An infectiousness model presented 
by Ferretti et  al. suggests that pre-symptomatic and 
symptomatic individuals cause between a third and half 
of all transmissions, respectively, whereas continuously 
asymptomatic infected individuals and environmental 
transmission play a minor role [7].
At the beginning of the pandemic, the basic reproduc-
tive number  R0 for COVID-19 in Wuhan was reported 
to be around 2.0 by several authors [8–10]. However, 
the distribution of individual R values was described to 
be highly over-dispersed, with 80% of infections being 
caused by less than 10% of cases [11, 12]. This finding 
is in line with the concept of the empirical 20/80 rule – 
suggesting that 20% of individuals contribute to at least 
80% of transmission potential. This rule was based on 
observational and modeling studies more than 20 years 
ago [13], and many host-pathogen interactions were later 
found to follow this rule [14].
Individuals disproportionately infecting a large number 
of others with a pathogen are called “super-spreaders”. 
Super-spreading events were described in transmission 
events during the SARS-CoV epidemic in 2003 and also 
for MERS-CoV [15–18]. In COVID-19, such events were 
reported in hospitals, in choir rehearsals, holiday visits, 
and restaurant meals [19–23]. Here, we report a cluster of 
eleven COVID-19 cases in a thirteen-person team work-
ing in an open-space office, taking place in the canton of 
Zurich, Switzerland, with onset on March 10, 2020. By 
this day, the total number of confirmed COVID-19 cases 
in the canton of Zurich was 88, corresponding to overall 
0.06 cases per 1000 inhabitants [24]. Prevailing recom-
mendations of the Swiss Federal Office of Public Health 
for employees included social distancing, office-splitting, 
home office and hand hygiene, however, wearing of face 
masks was not advised. We conducted a retrospective 
cohort study and outbreak investigation to assess second-




We conducted a retrospective outbreak investigation 
and cohort study of a cluster of COVID-19 cases in a 
team of 13 members performing desk work in an open-
space office. Semi-structured telephone interviews with 
all team members were carried out to obtain data about 
demographics, work attendance, activity patterns, con-
tact with team and household members, adherence to 
hygiene measures, and clinical symptoms. Interviews 
were audiotaped after informed consent was obtained. 
During site visits in the open-space office information 
about workplace and seating arrangements and the ven-
tilation system was obtained.
Definitions
A confirmed case of COVID-19 was defined as any indi-
vidual with a respiratory sample positive for SARS-CoV-2 
using a laboratory-based PCR test, or any individual with 
symptoms suggestive for COVID-19 with an epidemio-
logical link to a PCR-positive individual and an individual 
in whom SARS-CoV-2-specific antibodies were detected. 
A probable case of COVID-19 was defined as any indi-
vidual with symptoms suggestive for COVID-19 having 
an epidemiological link to a confirmed case. The day of 
symptom onset was defined as the day when any first 
symptom occurred, including non-specific symptoms 
such as fatigue.
The potential infective period was defined as 48 h 
before to 10 days after symptom onset or 48 h after symp-
tom cessation, whatever occurred later. The incubation 
period was calculated as the mean time from first to 
last exposure until development of symptoms. A high-
risk contact was defined as a face-to-face contact with a 
COVID-19 case within 2 m and longer than 15 min, or 
direct contact with respiratory secretions of a COVID-19 
case. Secondary attack rates were calculated as number 
of cases divided by number of contacts. Fisher’s exact test 
was used to calculate 95% confidence intervals. For the 
“office attack rate” exclusively confirmed cases were con-
sidered, for the “household attack rate” probable cases 
were also included.
SARS‑CoV‑2 PCR and serology
Diagnostic testing for SARS-CoV-2 was performed 
through RT-PCR of a nasopharyngeal swab as 
described by Corman et  al. [25]. Cycle threshold (Ct) 
values of the E gene target were obtained from the first 
diagnostic PCR. Nasopharyngeal swabs were tested 
for respiratory viruses other than SARS-CoV-2 by the 
CE-IVD marked FTD Respiratory Pathogens 21 Mul-
tiplex-PCR (Fast-track Diagnostics, Siemens Health-
ineers, Erlangen, Germany). This panel simultaneously 
detects influenza A/B, respiratory syncytial virus A/B, 
non-SARS Coronaviridae (NL63, 229E, OC43, HKU1), 
parainfluenza virus 1–4, metapneumovirus A/B, 
bocavirus, adenovirus, rhinovirus/enterovirus, pare-
chovirus and Mycoplasma pneumoniae. This test was 
performed in 9 team members with sufficient sample 
material available (E1-E5 and E8-E11). SARS-CoV-2 
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serologic testing was performed using an in-house 
developed bead-based antibody assay using Luminex 
technology that detects IgG, IgA and IgM antibod-
ies against subunit 1 (S1), subunit 2 (S2) of the spike 
protein and nucleoprotein (NP) of SARS-CoV-2 in 
individuals after a minimum of 14 days after symptom 
onset or a minimum of 60 days after exposure in non-
symptomatic individuals.
SARS‑CoV‑2 genome sequencing and analysis
SARS-CoV-2 whole-genome sequencing was per-
formed using a previously described tiled-amplicon 
sequencing approach [26, 27]. Total nucleic acids 
were extracted followed by reverse transcription with 
random hexamers and oligo-dT priming (ratio 3:1) 
using SuperScript IV Reverse Transcriptase (Thermo 
Fisher Scientific) [28]. The generated cDNA was used 
as input for 14 overlapping PCR reactions (ca. 2.5 kb 
each) spanning the viral genome using Platinum 
SuperFi DNA Polymerase (Thermo Fisher Scientific). 
Amplicons were pooled per patient before NexteraXT 
library preparation and sequencing on an Illumina 
MiSeq for 1 × 151 cycles. To generate SARS-CoV-2 
consensus sequences, all reads were iteratively aligned 
using SmaltAlign (githu b.com/medvi r/Smalt Align ). 
Sequences were uploaded to GISAID (accession num-
bers EPI_ISL_508,864 to 508,864; 509,222). Multiple 
sequence alignment was done with MAFFT v7.271 
[29], followed by phylogenetic analysis using RAxML 
[30].
Ethical approval
The Zurich Cantonal Ethics Commission waived the 
necessity for a formal ethical evaluation based on the 
Swiss law on research on humans (Req-2020-00324).
Results
Team and workspace
The team consisted of 13 individuals with a median age 
of 49 years (IQR, 44–55). The workplace is located in a 
 700m2 sized open-plan office, approximately one quarter 
of the office is occupied with the concerned team (Fig. 1). 
A service area is located in the middle of the office for 
individual consumption. Restrooms are shared with other 
teams on the same floor. Each team member owns a per-
sonal workstation with desk and computer, and worksta-
tions are a minimum of 0.8 m apart. A  30m2 conference 
room and several smaller meeting rooms of  7m2 or  9m2 
are available. The ventilation system provides air renewal 
within 1 hour in the open office space, and within 15 min 
in the conference room, respectively. There is no recircu-
lation of air or strong directed airflow. Windows can be 
tilted, but not completely opened.
Description of COVID‑19 outbreak
During 13 interviews with a median duration of 37 min 
we obtained the following information: On March 10, 
employee E1 experienced symptoms of fatigue and mini-
mal cough at noon and left the office early in the after-
noon. The following day, he informed the company’s 
medical officer about his condition and was isolated at 
home. He was not tested as he did not fulfill the test-
ing criteria for SARS-CoV-2 at that time. On March 
Fig. 1 Floor plan and seating arrangement. a: Floor plan; b: Seating arrangement of affected team in the work area and in the conference room. 
Large coloured rectangles = desks (red: desk of the index case; orange: desks of team members with COVID-19 who fell ill until March 14; yellow: 
desks of team members with COVID-19 who fell ill after March 14; green: desks of team members who did not fall ill; blue: desks in conference 
room); Small blue rectangles = seats; Small blue circles = side seats
Page 4 of 8Weissberg et al. Antimicrob Resist Infect Control           (2020) 9:191 
13 – by then his respiratory symptoms had worsened 
and he reported rhinorrhea, sore throat, and fever – he 
was informed that his friend, with whom he had close 
contact on a party on March 7, had tested positive for 
SARS-CoV-2.
Two days after E1’s last presence in the office, in the late 
evening of March 12, his teammate E2 developed cough 
and did not attend work the next day. On March 13, six 
other team members (E3, E4, E5, E6, E7, and E8) started 
feeling unwell; E3, E5 and E8 stayed home, E6 developed 
prodromal symptoms in the afternoon while at work, and 
E4 and E7 developed first symptoms after the end of their 
workday. An eighth team member, E9, fell ill on March 
14. RT-PCRs for SARS-CoV-2, performed between 
March 14 and March 16, resulted positive for all employ-
ees E1-E9. Due to the sequence of events, E1 was consid-
ered the index patient for this outbreak. Home isolation 
and quarantine measures were imposed on March 15 for 
all sick and yet healthy team members, respectively.
On March 18, 8 days after onset of symptoms of E1, 
team member E10 fell ill, and was tested positive for 
SARS-CoV-2 the next day. On March 19, team member 
E11 came down with fever and cough. E11 had already 
been tested negative on March 15 while being asymp-
tomatic, and no SARS-CoV-2 PCR was performed after 
symptom onset. However, a serology taken from E11 
23 days after symptom onset resulted positive for SARS-
CoV-2-specific IgA, IgG and IgM. Therefore, 11 of 13 
team-members were considered confirmed COVID-
19 cases. Two team members (E12 and E13) remained 
asymptomatic throughout the 2 weeks after last expo-
sure and were tested seronegative 9 weeks after exposure. 
Symptoms of the team members are shown in Table 1.
Team interactions and adherence to hygiene measure
Physical presence of the individual team members in 
the office is depicted in Fig. 2. Every morning, the team 
performs a five-minute ‘huddle’ team meeting, standing 
close to each other between their workstations. Work-
ing together at the same workstation, including shar-
ing of mouse and keyboard, is frequent in this team. For 
this purpose, an extra chair is available at every desk. 









Sore throat 2 (18%)
Chest pain 2 (18%)
Back pain 2 (18%)
Diarrhea 1 (9%)
Fig. 2 Transmission chain of COVID-19. Abbreviations: h, hours; PCR, polymerase chain reaction
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All team members reported to have had high-risk con-
tacts with several other team-members in front of the 
computer throughout the week, but contacts could only 
rarely be reconstructed in detail, except that E1 spe-
cifically reported to have had frequent and close contact 
with E8 and E9 on March 10, while being introduced into 
new processes. Lunch breaks are usually spent among 
team members in the canteen, however, E1 did not join 
his teammates on March 9 and 10. Shared coffee breaks 
are not common, but E5 reported to have eaten nuts and 
dates from the same bowl as E1 on March 9 and 10.
On March 10, a one-hour team meeting took place in 
the conference room (Fig.  1) shortly before first symp-
toms developed in E1. During the meeting, E2 remem-
bered sitting next to the index case. Noteworthy, the 
participants sang “Happy Birthday” to celebrate a team 
members birthday (not E1’s birthday), but no hugs or 
kisses were exchanged. E5 joined the meeting later and 
was not present during singing. In summary, E1 spent 
approximately 3 h at work while having first prodromal 
symptoms.
On Friday 13, E4 and E10 had a meeting in the late 
afternoon, and E11 reported high-risk contact to almost 
all present team members. At this day, E6 had first pro-
dromal symptoms for approximately 2 h before leaving 
work. From March 16, all members of the team stayed 
home for isolation or quarantine.
During working hours, none of the team members was 
wearing a face mask or consistently maintained a physical 
distance (> 2 m) during personal interactions and team 
meetings. Six (46%) employees disinfected their hands on 
occasional or frequent basis, and adherence to respira-
tory etiquette was self-reported by 62% of all team-mem-
bers, including the index case.
Except E1, no other sick employee reported private 
contact with a person having symptoms compatible with 
COVID-19 within the 2 weeks before symptom onset or 
before quarantine.
Viral co‑infections and estimation of SARS‑CoV‑2 viral 
loads
The Ct value of E1’s SARS-CoV-2 PCR in a swab 4 days 
after symptom onset was 20.7, corresponding to approxi-
mately 10E8 virions/ml. Median Ct values of the other 
team members was 21.5 (IQR: 19.9–24), collected a mean 
of 1.3 days after symptom onset. To assess the presence of 
viral co-infections, the available nasopharyngeal swabs of 
nine team members were re-analyzed by multiplex PCR. 
Co-infection with adenovirus was found in the index 
patient E1 and in E3, genotyping of E1’s isolate revealed 
adenovirus E Serotype 4 (AdV-4). Sequencing of E3’s iso-
late was not performed.
Phylogenetic analysis
For eight of the eleven individuals, the full-length 
genome could be sequenced (for E6, E7 and E11 no 
material was available). Phylogenetic analysis showed 
that all sequences form a cluster within lineage 20A of 
SARS-CoV-2 (nextstrain nomenclature) [31]. Six of the 
sequences are identical, while E10 and E2 are each one 
nucleotide different from the others (Additional  file  1). 
Sequences of several other individuals from Switzerland 
not related to this outbreak, sampled before March 9, 
2020, have identical sequences.
Incubation period and secondary attack rate
Assuming that the index patient E1 passed the SARS-
CoV-2 to all ten team members (scenario 1), the sec-
ondary office attack rate caused by E1 was 83% (95%CI: 
52–98). Assuming that E10 and E11 were infected by 
other team members (scenario 2), the secondary office 
attack rate caused by E1 was 67% (95%CI: 35–90). The 
mean incubation period was 4.7 (95%CI: 3.2–6.2) and 4.1 
(95%CI: 3.5–4.7) days for scenario 1 and 2, respectively. 
The eleven employees with COVID-19 had 18 household 
contacts, of whom 11 were adults (Table  1). Second-
ary household attack rate of all eleven team members 
was 39% (95%CI: 17–64) overall, or 55% (95%CI: 23–83) 
in adult household members. In the two employees co-
infected with adenovirus household attack rate was 1/4 
(25%), while it was 6/14 (43%) in households of non-co-
infected employees.
Discussion
We report an outbreak of COVID-19 in a 13-person 
team doing desk work in an open-space office. The tem-
poral occurrence of COVID-19 cases and full genome 
sequence data suggest that the index case E1 acted as a 
super-spreader infecting eight or potentially ten of twelve 
teammates. The index case spent approximately 8 h in 
the pre-symptomatic and 3 h in an oligosymptomatic 
state with the team. Behavioral factors such as close team 
interactions with joint computer work and a one-hour 
team meeting including singing of a ‘Happy Birthday’ 
serenade, and environmental factors such as a congre-
gation in a  30m2 conference room might have propelled 
virus transmission. The co-infection of the index person 
with AdV-4, which was transmitted to one other team 
member, is noteworthy. Our report demonstrates high 
transmissibility of SARS-CoV-2 and the possibility of 
super-spreading events in office co-workers.
We found a secondary office attack rate caused by the 
index case of 67% when including employees with an 
incubation period of up to 5 days as secondary cases, 
or 83% when also including the two workmates with 
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an incubation period of 8 and 9 days. We consider both 
scenarios possible, as the median incubation period 
has been reported around 4 to 6 days [8, 11, 32], with a 
97.5%CI of 11 to 12 days [32, 33]. As the mutation rate 
of SARS-CoV-2 is known to be very low and most of the 
sequences of the reported cluster were identical, conclu-
sive identification of a transmission chain was not pos-
sible by phylogenetic analysis. The secondary attack rate 
we discovered in this place of work is high even in com-
parison to household transmissions - a setting with hypo-
thetically closer person to person contact compared to 
work settings - where secondary attack rates of 5 to 20% 
have been described [8, 11, 34–37]. Literature describing 
secondary attack rates related to one index-case in other 
than household settings is scarce. Some rare publications 
describe secondary attack rates of similar dimensions, i.e. 
in tourists sharing a holiday chalet (secondary attack rate, 
75%) and in people attending a choir rehearsal (second-
ary attack rate, 87%) [19, 23]. Reasons for super-spread-
ing events and the heterogeneity within the ability of 
infecting others remain unclear. In theory, environmental 
factors such as crowding or building ventilation, as well 
as host- or pathogen-related contributions have been dis-
cussed – and often more than one factor plays a role [14, 
38].
From the information gathered in the interviews with 
team members, we believe that host factors, specifically 
behavioral factors of all team members contributed to 
the outbreak within this team. Interactions during joint 
computer work lead to proximity, a prerequisite for drop-
let transmission, and eating nuts from the same bowl as 
the index case facilitates indirect contact transmission. 
The one-hour team meeting including singing a “Happy 
Birthday” serenade probably has also fueled transmission 
of SARS-CoV-2 as several super-spreading events have 
been reported from choir rehearsals [23]. Correspond-
ingly, one of the two unaffected team members did not 
join the specific meeting. We were not able to identify 
other non-behavioral host-specific risk factors. It would 
have been interesting, though, to further assess physio-
logical factors of the index case, such as particle emission 
during speech, as the concept of speech super-emitters 
was postulated by Asadi et al. [39].
We also consider environmental factors relevant for 
this open space office outbreak. Employees’ desks are 
arranged close to each other and the team meeting took 
place in a confined conference room with eleven people 
enclosed in  30m2, precluding the suggested minimum 
distance between people of > 2 m. Prolonged, unpro-
tected exposure in closed congregations were already 
described to be a risk factor for SARS-CoV-2 transmis-
sion [40, 41]. On the other hand, we do not have evidence 
that the ventilation system played an active role in this 
outbreak. In comparison to other settings where air con-
dition was suspected to facilitate transmission [22], there 
is no strong directed airflow in the rooms of this open 
space office and also no air recirculation. Since it is not 
yet clear if aerosols might be involved in the transmission 
of SARS-CoV-2, we cannot formally rule out, though, 
that a higher air change rate might have been beneficial 
to lower transmission risk, especially after droplet- and 
aerosol-generating procedures such as singing.
Pathogen-related factors might have also played a role 
in this cluster. The index case E1 had a relatively high viral 
load of 10E8 4 days after symptom onset. Viral loads of 
SARS-CoV-2 were observed to be highest at the time of 
symptom onset, and infectiousness was inferred to peak 
on or before symptom onset [6]. Therefore, we hypothe-
size an even higher viral load in the hours before or at the 
beginning of symptom onset – a time E1 spent with office 
colleagues. Additionally, the index case was co-infected 
with an adenovirus. AdV-4 has caused several outbreaks 
of febrile respiratory infections in civilian and military 
populations [42]. Viral co-infections were described to 
facilitate dispersal of different bacterial pathogens and 
were hypothesized to have facilitated a super-spreading 
event of SARS-CoV transmissions in 2003 [43]. Sher-
ertz et  al. found that rhinovirus infection leads to high 
dispersal of Staphylococcus aureus in the air even in the 
absence of coughing or sneezing [44]. The mechanism 
for this effect still is unclear, but may be caused by swell-
ing of the nasal turbinates and narrowing air passages, in 
turn leading to a higher speed of the turbulent air flow, 
which could create air-dispersed infectious particles [44]. 
The adenovirus of the index case was transmitted to only 
one other team member. To systematically evaluate the 
relevance of respiratory co-infections in occurrence of 
SARS-CoV-2 transmission higher sample sizes would be 
needed.
Our study has limitations. First, an imperfect or biased 
recall could have affected the accuracy of the data such as 
information about contacts and the exact time of symp-
tom-onset. For example, the seating arrangements dur-
ing the team meeting and information about occurrence 
and duration of person-to-person interactions could not 
be recalled in detail. This, in turn, prevented the identi-
fication of perspicuous reasons for not falling sick of the 
two team members E12 and E13. Second, exposure of 
teammates to one or several other index persons other 
than E1 cannot be excluded, as there are other identical 
sequences from Switzerland sampled before this super-
spreading event. However, in view of the very low total 
number of confirmed COVID-19 cases in the canton of 
Zurich, Switzerland, at the time of the described out-
break and the close temporal occurrence of cases, we 
consider transmission within this team highly likely [24]. 
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Third, most of the team member’s household contacts 
did not seek testing to confirm COVID-19 as the cause of 
their illness. It is therefore possible that they had another 
respiratory disease and were falsely classified as probable 
COVID-19 cases.
In summary, we describe a COVID-19 cluster caused 
by a super-spreading event in an open-space office and 
were able to identify several behavioral and environmen-
tal factors propelling transmission. High-density work 
environments with close person-to-person contact are 
common worldwide. As reports about super-spreading 
events in open space offices are scarce, we assume them 
to be the exception rather than the rule and that either 
the combination of several factors was relevant for this 
event or that a specific, still not clearly recognizable fac-
tor played a crucial role. Singing might have been rele-
vant, as this is an extraordinary activity for workspaces 
and was reported to have facilitated transmission in 
other settings. Host specific physiological factors could 
have also played a role, but they are inherently difficult 
to evaluate, especially retrospectively. And the adeno-
virus co-infection might have acted synergistically. Fur-
ther research is needed to investigate a potential causal 
relationship of co-infections and super-spreading events 
in COVID-19. Early identification of potential super-
spreaders or factors facilitating super-spreading events 
are of great importance for controlling the dissemination 
of COVID-19. Until more is known about risk factors for 
SARS-CoV-2 super-spreading, we suggest to strictly fol-
low the rules on hygiene, social distancing, and wearing a 
mask if distancing is not feasible at all workspaces, espe-
cially in open-space offices.
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